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Reviewed by Patrick J. Monahan*
The recent round of Canadian constitutional reform has spawned
a veritable flood of legal and political commentary. For students of
Canadian affairs grappling with this ever-growing body of literature,
And No One Cheered stands out as essential reading. This collection
of seventeen essays cuts through much of the rhetoric and posturing
surrounding

the

reform

process

to

give

an

incisive

and

uncompromising analysis of the struggle and its outcome. The
contributors approach the events they describe from widely different
and often conflicting perspectives. Yet they all seem agreed in their
verdict on Canada's constitutional labors: this moment in the nation's
collective history has been a time of lost opportunities and shattered
illusions rather than of vision and rebirth. Canadians had an
unprecedented

opportunity

to

restructure

and

revitalize

their

constitutional arrangements, but their political elites allowed the
opportunity to slip through their fingers. Not only have Canada's
underlying political tensions remained unresolved but, arguably, they
have been exacerbated by the bitterness and polarization created by
the reform process.
The first group of essays in the volume examines the
*
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constitutional reform process from the perspective of federalism.
The institutions

of

federal

government

are

an

attempt

to

accommodate the two great cleavages in the Canadian polity:
dualism and regionalism. As the introductory essay by Banting and
Simeon argues, these

cleavages

have generated two starkly

contrasting visions of the nature of the Canadian community.1
Dualism contrasts an image of Canada as two distinct societies or
nations with a second image of Canada as a single, bilingual unit.
Regionalism expands and develops this contrast in background
conceptions. It sees Canada either as a collection of regional
communities or as a unified polity that is more than the sum of its
parts. The authors of the first group of essays argue that the
constitutional Accord2 failed to reconcile or transcend these
contradictory visions of the country. Instead, it was a "blunt and
brutal compromise"3 which, at best, will provide only a temporary
ceasefire in the relentless intergovernmental war.
The most negative and angry response comes from the four
Quebecers in this first group. Their essays begin with the
assumption that the distinctive national character of Quebec
society requires an expansion of the constitutional authority of
the Quebec government. They regard the constitutional Accord as
a betrayal of that vision of Canada. Particularly important is the
essay by Daniel Latouche.4 Although Latouche is fired by a sense

of outrage at the "constitutional mouse" delivered by the "federalprovincial mountain," his essay offers analysis as well as emotion.
In particular he argues that Quebecers must share part of the
blame for their fate. Quebec's political leaders since 1960 have been
unable to agree on a constitutional

strategy and pursue it

effectively. Instead, they have been obsessed with negotiation:
"one partner wanted to negotiate without necessarily reaching
agreement, while the other would have liked to reach an agreement
without negotiation" (p. 98). In this ambiguity lay the seeds of a
constitutional "hijacking." The essay by Gerard Bergeron5 is less
successful. Like Latouche, Bergeron articulates forcefully Quebec's
disillusionment with federalism following its exclusion from the
constitutional Accord of November 1981. Yet Bergeron makes little
attempt to analyze this process or its implications for Quebec. He
contents

himself

with

simply

recounting

the reactions

of

Quebecers and justifying the tactics and the policies of the
Levesque government. Bergeron finds it necessary to reassure his
confused readers that "the experience of Quebecers is not as
dramatic as that of the Poles, that Trudeau has not imposed the
same fate on Levesque as Jaruzelski has on Lech Walesa" (p. 67).
In contrast, Roger Gibbins' perceptive essay is written from a
pan-Canadian perspective.6 Gibbins regards the erosion of federal
institutions and political authority as the great crisis of Canadian

federalism. The unrepresentative character of our national political
institutions has produced strong sentiments for reform in Western
Canada. Yet the West has been unable to generate any coherent,
alternative vision of how the country ought to function. Instead,
the articulation of Western discontent has been monopolized by
provincial premiers whose uppermost

concern

has been to

preserve their own prerogatives and power. In Gibbins' view, a
succession of Western premiers has been far more interested in
minor refinements to the existing system that would safeguard
provincial

power rather

than in

fundamental

reform.

Thus,

paradoxically, instead of generating impetus for change, the alienated
West has assumed a "largely defensive posture, protecting an
institutional status quo that should not have been defended, not in its
present form, and not by the West" (p. 122). Gibbins sees the main
failing of the Constitution Act, 1982 as its strengthening of the
position of Western Canadian provincial governments. The Act
confirms the proposition that "the constitution is the property and
prerogative of governments rather than the people governments
represent" (p. 127). Gibbins' great strength is his ability to overcome
the pervasive tendency to identify existing patterns of hierarchy or
privilege as natural or inevitable forms of social oranization.7
The second section of the volume is comprised of essays
analyzing the role of the Supreme Court of Canada in the

constitutional reform process. The authors of these essays regard
the historic judgment of 28 September 19818 as one of the most
important ever delivered by the Court. William Lederman's essay9
adopts an avowedly realist stance. He argues that the majority and
minority judgments in the case are explicable only in terms of the
judges' contrasting conceptions of the nature of Canadian federalism.
In his view, this follows from the fact that, although the various
judges

were

reading

the

same

constitutional

history

and

precedents, they came to radically different conclusions on the legal
issues. Unfortunately, though, Lederman's analysis raises more
questions

than

it answers. If the

essence

of

constitutional

adjudication consists of asking jurists to elaborate their beliefs about
the nature of Canadian federalism, how does this process differ
from political reasoning in general? Moreover, why should choices
of this type be the preserve of an unrepresentative group of elite
lawyers? 10 Lederman does not resolve these underlying problems.11
Noting that the judgments

of the court were thorough and

scholarly, he concludes that "authoritative judicial review is alive
and well and living in Canada" (p. 187).
Peter Russell is more critical of the Court's performance. 12 He
rejects the Court's view that constitutional conventions are in no
sense part of constitutional law. But, Russell argues, once the Court
accepted this stark distinction, it should have refused to answer the

reference question dealing with constitutional conventions. If there
is, in fact, a wide gulf separating law from convention, the court was
simply engaging in politics by rendering a decision on the
conventional issue. As such, Russell regards the court's judgment
as lacking intellectual coherence.
The final group of essays examines the reform process from the
perspective of democracy. The theme running through these essays is
the weak nature of Canada's commitment to any thorough-going
form of. popular sovereignty. The recent process of constitutional
reform reveals Canadian politics to be a "process of democratic
elitism tempered

by

occasional

populist anger."13

The

most

prominent exposition of this argument is the essay by Reginald
Whitaker.14 He suggests that Canadian politics has always been
an elite affair; the primary role of the constitution having been to
maintain

peace

between

governments

rather

than

between

government and the people. Whitaker sees the roots of this elitist
tradition in the eighteenth century British doctrine that sovereignty
lies in the Crown-in-Parliament, as opposed to the people
themselves. In his analysis of the most recent reform episode,
Whitaker sees faint indications that Canadians were prepared to
break with these anti-democratic assumptions. He suggests that
there were some significant aspects of the original federal proposals
which did recognize elements of popular sovereignty. But these

democratic elements were vigorously attacked and eventually
eradicated. In this way, "Canadian traditions were preserved" (p.
260).
The verdict of these essays is harsh, but not unfair. They
deserve to be read not just by professional students of Canadian
affairs, but by the general Canadian public. Anyone who does so
will come away with the conviction that more meaningful
constitutional reform is imperative in the near future. The issue,
of course, is whether such change is still possible. Most of these
essayists seem to believe that the political elites, as well as the
citizenry, have been exhausted by the long years of constitutional
wrangling and now wish to deal with other matters. It is almost as
if the incumbents of privilege, having beaten back the forces for

change, have become impregnable. .But this view is mistaken,
reflecting the "dark fatalism which bids men regard themselves as
the sport of fate, their conditions beyond curing, their lot one to
endure."15 This fatalism is only necessary or inevitable if Canadians
choose to make it so. The lost opportunities of 1982 need not
remain lost forever. They must be a springboard to action and not
acquiescence.
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